Introduction
One field in which the EU expanded its competence as a cyber-security actor is that of the enforcement of intellectual property rights by tackling trademark infringements taking place online. Originally concerned with efforts to facilitate the completion of the internal market, the EU's trademark policies have increasingly focused upon concerns over the security threats posed by the importation of illegal counterfeit goods into the EU, and in particular, the use of the Internet as the means for this illicit trade. However, the use of 'hard' regulatory approaches to this problem, in the form of legislation seeking to curtail illicit conduct such as the E-Commerce Directive and Enforcement Directive, and expanding EU competences to tackle the online sale of counterfeits by means of international agreements such as the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, have had limited success; as a result, the Commission has focused upon alternative means of tackling the online counterfeiting trade. In particular, the Commission has sought to establish itself as a centre of expertise in this field, establishing the European Observatory on Infringements of Intellectual Property Rights (hereafter the Observatory) as a means of identifying and sharing data on enforcement and best practices, as well as facilitating networks of private sector actors in proactively combatting the trade of counterfeit goods online. This article will demonstrate the means by which the EU has sought to supplement its 'hard' legal regime with 'soft' information gathering, cooperation and coordination mechanisms, highlighting the difficulties in establishing legal regimes for combatting the sale of counterfeit goods online, as well as how the Observatory has been established as a key actor in the management of online trademark infringements.
According to the EU's Cyber-Security Strategy, cyber-security refers "to the safeguards and actions that can be used to protect the cyber domain, both in the civilian and military fields, from those threats that are associated with or that may harm its interdependent networks and information infrastructure" (2013, p. 3) . Within the field of cyber-security, the combatting of cybercrime constitutes a main area of activity (Fafinski et al., 2010) , complementing actions combatting activities categorised as cyber-espionage and cyber-warfare (Grauman, 2012) . According to the EU, cybercrime constitutes "a broad range of different criminal activities where computers and information systems are involved either as a primary tool or as a primary target"
(European Commission and High Representative of the European Union for Foreign
Affairs and Security Policy, 2013, p. 3) .
For this reason, a more narrow conceptualisation of cyber-security that focuses on attacks against network information systems, which is particularly common amongst computer engineers and technicians (Stevens, 2015, pp. 8-9) , misses the broader potential uses of network information systems to crimes. The UK Government, for example, has included the combatting of cybercrime as a key component of its own cyber-security strategy, not only concerned with protecting infrastructure deemed essential to national security, but also to ensure a safe environment for online business transactions, both for commercial actors as well as for consumers (HM Government, 2011, pp. 36-38) . Indeed, the perception that cybercrime is 'rife' on the Internet has been indicated as a key factor impacting business and consumer trust and confidence in the use of the Internet, particularly for ecommerce (Broadhurst, 2006; Smith, 2004) , with the EU perceiving combatting criminal activity as a key means of increasing "confidence and the enhancement of market integrity" (Herlin-Karnell, 2015, p. 54) . The EU takes a similar approach to the issue of cybercrime in its Cyber-Security Strategy, noting that "the EU economy is already affected by cybercrime activities against the private sector and individuals" (2013, p. 3),
and that cybercrime poses a significant threat as it "knows no borders" (2013, p. 9). In the 2015 Digital Single Market Strategy, the Commission again reiterates the threat to business and consumer confidence presented by illegal activity on the Internet, and considers building trust in Internet security, including the combatting of online content offences, a priority (European Commission, 2015, pp. 12, 14) . Counterfeiting can constitute a form of cybercrime, insofar as the Internet is used as the means of advertising the availability of counterfeit goods, and indeed, more easily facilitates their distribution. The EU's Single Market Act Communication indicated that combatting counterfeiting more effectively was to be considered a key policy (2011a, p. 9), within the context of a policy agenda intended to ensure sustainable growth in light of the financial crisis. For the EU, counterfeiting and other forms of intellectual property infringement deprive "EU creators of appropriate rewards, create barriers to innovation, harm competitiveness, destroy jobs, decrease public finances and possibly threaten the health and safety of EU citizens" (2011b, p. 17), resulting in protection of intellectual property rights being framed as a security issue (see also Farrand and Carrapico, 2012) . One of the means the EU has identified to combat this perceived security threat, particularly where it relates to the online facilitation of counterfeit sales, is the empowerment of the Observatory (2011a, p. 9), as this article will discuss.
As well as further exploring the role of the EU as a cyber-security actor in the field of online distribution of intellectual property-infringing goods, an issue relatively unexplored in EU cyber-security literature, this article contributes to the understanding of the Observatory and its functions as a regulator, which has received little attention in comparison to other EU agencies, with academic literature often doing little more than confirming its existence (see for example Acquah, 2015; Falkner, 2013; Geiger, 2012; Godart, 2010; Grant, 2012; O'Neill, 2011; Peukert, 2011) . This article therefore contributes both to understanding of the EU as a cyber-security actor in the field of intellectual property generally, as well as the role of agencies in these activities specifically.
Governing through networks: -EU agencies, stakeholder expertise and the establishment of the European Observatory on Infringements of Intellectual Property Rights
The early twenty-first century has seen a proliferation of European agencies. These EUlevel agencies, argue Trondal and Jeppesen, "contribute to technical and sectoral knowhow […and] is one way for the Commission to control the implementation of community regulation […] as well as securing expertise, credibility and visibility" (2008, pp. 417-418) . This 'agencification' of the EU has been claimed to follow similar trends at the national level, particularly in Western Europe (Christensen and Laegreid, 2007) , and in line with dominant beliefs concerning the importance of market liberalisation with stakeholder involvement in regulation (Levi-Faur and Jordana, 2005) . As Levi-Faur has stated, the development of these agencies must be placed in context; the new regulatory model is social, political and economic, based in principles of market efficiency that both serve to constitute and moderate the current capitalist system (2005, p. 14) . In this 'regulatory capitalism' framework, the state "retains responsibility for steering, while business increasingly takes over the functions of service provision and technological innovation […it entails] a restructuring of the state (through delegation and the creation of regulatory agencies)" (Levi-Faur, 2005, p. 15 Regulation is particularly useful in identifying the means by which the EU has expanded its capacity as a cyber-security actor. Through repositioning the Observatory as an information-gathering agency within the structure of EUIPO, the EU has sought to establish both credibility and expertise concerning the scale of counterfeiting in the EU, including on the Internet. By establishing the Observatory within an agency structure, it helps to ensure the resilience of the relationships between public and private actors involved in gathering data concerning infringement, through a process of formalisation of roles that "bridges the gaps between insulated hierarchies to form a network of stable and interdependent relations" (Levi-Faur, 2012, p. 37) . Spitzlinger, 2011; Zemer, 2007) . Instead, the original impetus for the protection of these signs or identifying marks was based in notions of consumer protection. As
Ramirez-Montes argues, the genesis of trademark in the English common law system was intended as a means of ensuring that consumers could be assured as to the origin and quality of goods, while at the same time protecting the interest of traders in honest competition (2010, pp. 92-93) . The initial forays into trademark law by the Commission were taken on the basis of achieving internal market harmonisation goals, and a desire to ensure that intellectual property rights would not serve as a barrier to trade (European Commission, 1976, p. 7) . The resulting legislation therefore served to establish a common Community Trade Mark (now, as stated above, the European Union
Trade Mark as of the 2015 Amending Regulation), to be registered at EUIPO, with the intent that it was to be "confined to fundamental rules, the harmonisation of which was deemed indispensable to the completion of the internal market" (Kur, 1997, p. 3).
Nevertheless, measures to protect the market for trademarked goods were being developed alongside measures to harmonise the market. As early as 1985, concerns regarding the acts of counterfeiting led to the European Parliament's Committee on Legal Affairs and Citizens Rights drafting a report (European Parliament, 1985) in response to a Commission proposal for a Regulation on counterfeiting (European Commission, 1984) . According to this report, counterfeiting was considered to be a 'jargon' term, covering the making and/or selling of products similar to well-known products on the market, with the mark or name of the manufacturer of the original goods (1985, p. 13) -often linked together with 'piracy', the infringement of copyright 1 .
The reason for wishing to prevent such conduct was clear -in addition to constituting a potential harm to legitimate businesses as well as impacting upon the development of the internal market, they were considered as posing "a threat to the health and safety of consumers everywhere" (1984, p. 19) . Furthermore, counterfeiting at this time appears to have been considered as a problem originating outside of the EU; the proposed Regulation intended to provide for a common procedure for preventing the goods entering the internal market by means of using custom services to stop counterfeit goods from countries such as Taiwan, Hong Kong, South Korea and Brazil at the external frontiers of the EEC (1985, pp. 13, 18-19) .
The resulting Regulation (1986), however, was considered as having certain deficiencies. In particular, the definition provided for counterfeit goods was considered insufficient, including only those "goods bearing without authorization a trade mark" in Article 1(2)(a). The result of this was that goods were being imported without any marks, the identifying marks shipped separately, and then affixed subsequent to their importation into the EEC (European Commission, 1991, p. 6). The Commission proposed the repeal and replacement of the Regulation with one with a more comprehensive definition of counterfeit goods, as well as proposing additional improvements to the customs identification and seizure procedures (European Commission, 1993) . The resulting Regulation (1994) expands the definition of 1 While it is not the main focus of this paper, it is nevertheless important to distinguish between the different forms of intellectual property infringement, despite 'counterfeiting' and 'piracy' often being discussed and classified together -in particular, whereas copyright infringement may cause economic harm to a right-holder, the significant risks to public health and safety that arise from certain forms of counterfeit good are not necessarily existent when considering acts of piracy (see Farrand and Carrapico, 2012, pp. 395-398) counterfeit goods under Article 1(2)(a) to cover packaging and any trademark symbols, including labels, stickers or instructions for use, and which bears "without authorization a trade mark which is identical to the trade mark validly registered in respect of the same type of goods, or which cannot be distinguished in its essential aspects from such trade mark". It is in 1998, however, that the discourse concerning counterfeiting becomes one dominated by questions of security (see generally Farrand and Carrapico, 2012) . In the 1998 Green Paper on counterfeiting and piracy, the Commission states that "counterfeiting is also rife in sectors involving products which are highly sensitive from the point of view of public health and safety, such as medicinal products, medical equipment, toys, and spare parts for cars and aeroplanes" (1998, p. 8 customs enforcement of intellectual property rights, the Commission concluded that "given that counterfeiting and piracy on the Internet are a growing cause for concern, the Commission intends to keep a close eye on developments and will, if necessary, take appropriate initiatives" (2000, p. 5). As the next two sections of the article will demonstrate, however, the EU has faced significant hurdles regarding the management of online counterfeit sales, based in a lack of useable data on the phenomenon, and in coordinating the action of interested actors in the online environment, two problems that the establishment of the Observatory is intended to remedy.
The Observatory as a source of information: -better regulation through better evidence provision
The Commission has found that assessing the impact of the online sale of counterfeits upon the internal market is a difficult and indeed unenviable task. Referring back to the 1998 Green Paper that launched the EU's anti-online counterfeiting policies, the Commission admitted that the scale was difficult to estimate, and the impact difficult to quantify (1998, p. 10). In the Follow-up, the Commission reiterated that the exact economic impact of the activity was unknown, but noted that "interested parties" estimated the combined impact of counterfeiting and piracy to be "€200 to €300 billion a year and with global losses of 200,000 jobs a year" (2000, p. 4). However, this figure has been subject to substantial criticism due to its inaccuracy (see for example Sanchez, 2008 on the origins of these, and similar figures), as well as its unquestioned use by policy-makers as a basis for legislative action (Farrand, 2014) and the blurring of the boundaries of copyright infringement and trademark infringement, masking both the different economic values of each activity and the potential consumer harm (Farrand and Carrapico, 2012 ; see also Heinonen et al., 2014; Sullivan et al., 2014) . In its 2008
Conclusions (mentioned above) the Competitiveness Council, perhaps aware of the concerns regarding the validity and reliability of data on online infringements, commented that the Observatory could serve to ensure "a more precise analysis of these phenomena" (2008, para. 15) , and in 2009 the Commission subsequently noted that one of the biggest challenges in this field was the collection of valid data, and that due to data being held by a myriad of national enforcement bodies, intellectual property offices and private sector corporations, any held data on the economic impact of online counterfeit sales was often "difficult to assimilate" (2009, p. 5).
Nevertheless, despite concerns expressed regarding the reliability and validity of economic data, the potential risks of counterfeit goods and the fact that they are being advertised and distributed through the Internet, are considered readily apparent by stakeholders and EU agencies such as Europol. In their provocatively titled report 'The Counterfeiting Superhighway', the European Alliance for Access to Safe Medicines (EAASM) argued that in a test performed, 36 medicines were bought from online, nonverified 'pharmacies', with laboratory analysis finding that over 62% of medicines tested were either counterfeit, substandard or unapproved generic medicines (2008, p. 27 ). The EAASM also estimated that 1% of medicines sold in the EU were counterfeit, representing 7 million prescriptions in the UK alone, and that "the Internet, now fairly ubiquitous in Europe though poorly regulated with regard to buying medicines, represents a major loophole through which counterfeit medicines can reach consumers" There is evidence to suggest that online marketing of counterfeit goods is not solely limited to sophisticated and highly technical activities such as the establishment of online pharmacy-imitating websites, but also includes a more 'mundane' transition of offline activities to the online environment (Treadwell, 2012, p. 176) . At the local level, to confirm the concerns of the Commission regarding the implications of the Internet for the distribution of counterfeit goods. Of particular concern is that online transactions facilitate the transfer of 'small consignments' -packages sent directly to individual buyers in the EU containing the counterfeit items rather than large shipping containers full of thousands of goods for subsequent marketing and distribution within the EU. For customs officials, online purchases of counterfeit goods creates a considerable problem -"the massive flow of packages containing infringing goods poses a serious challenge, because of their sheer quantity, as well as their ability to blend into the mass of postal packages" (Schneider and Maillefer, 2015, p. 263) . Given the difficulties in identifying these goods in transit and upon arrival at the EU's external borders, the quantities of such goods reaching the internal market has been difficult to ascertain. This substantial lack of information in turn has led to difficulties in the combatting of such infringements. In this way, the online sale of counterfeit goods can be considered a cyber-security in two key ways. The first is that the sale of counterfeits online, a form of cybercrime, impacts upon network security insofar as it leads to a decrease in consumer and business confidence in the use of the Internet for online transactions, deemed to be of high importance in ensuring the competitiveness of the EU as an economic area (European Commission, 2015, pp. 13-14) . The second is that through the sale online of goods posing a significant health threat to EU consumers, the Internet is used as the means of engaging in illegal activity presenting a threat to the physical security of individuals (Leontiadis and Hutchings, 2015; Mackey and Liang, 2013 ).
Action at the EU level was therefore justified on the grounds that acts of counterfeiting and piracy, which by their nature take place on a global scale and disregard national borders, cannot be effectively tackled at a local or national level due to insufficient information and expertise, necessitating coordinated EU responses (Council Regulation, 2012, recital 25) . Upon its establishment, the Observatory quickly solidified its position as an information repository for the combatting of intellectual property infringements, facilitating information exchange between the national and European levels. The
Observatory describes itself as being "a network of experts and specialist stakeholders" to share information on infringement practices, and then publishing reports on counterfeiting, the Observatory seeks to provide the EU with a repository for technical know-how and expertise that can then serve to reinforce the position of the EU as an actor in this field. As the subsequent section will demonstrate, however, the effectiveness of the Observatory equally applies to improving online enforcement as well as data gathering.
The Observatory as a network regulator: -mitigating problems of coordination and cooperation online
Responding to the new means of committing traditional content-related crimes facilitated by computer technologies, the EU moved quickly to set up a legal framework for the removal of illegal content online, including information pertaining to counterfeit items on the Internet. The E-Commerce Directive (2000) provides for the limitation of liability for ISPs and online intermediaries under Articles 12-14, so long as they do not initiate, modify or select the recipient of a data transmission in the case of an ISP, or fail to act to remove illegal content or limit illegal activity when it is brought to their attention in the case of online intermediaries. As Julia-Barcelo and Koelman wrote at the time of the passing of the directive, as well as covering the distribution of illegal materials such as child abuse media and defamatory statements, it was intended that this Directive also be used to combat copyright and trademark infringements (2000, p.
231). According to Swartout (2011) However, efforts to achieve this result through formal and legally binding rules have proven to be unsuccessful. In the Single Market Act Communication, the Commission stated that the provision of online services for digital media "must be accompanied by European legislation to combat piracy and counterfeiting more effectively" (2011a, p. will not bring back any controversial provisions of ACTA" (Cirlig, 2014, p. 27 ).
Furthermore, penal reform and the role of online intermediaries in combatting counterfeiting is explicitly outside of the remit of negotiations (Cirlig, 2014, p. 28 ). An interesting development that has occurred at the level of the EU is the promotion of an alternative means of regulation to combat Internet-based counterfeit sales. As opposed to the establishment of legally binding enforcement mechanisms, the Commission has instead sought to use agency and network relationships as a means of ensuring online compliance with intellectual property protection requirements. The EU has further established its position as an intellectual property-related cyber-security actor through the creation and coordination of specialised networks for the 'informal' enforcement of intellectual property rights online. Informal, in this context, refers to informal rules and procedures that are not enshrined in law and do not have legal force, with the result that 'enforcement' is also informal and operates outside of official channels (Helmke and Levitsky, 2004, p. 727; Stacey, 2013, p. 396) . This approach may be adopted for two key reasons -the first, that there may be some fields where formal competences do not exist or the formalisation of such rules through legislation is difficult to achieve (Heisenberg, 2013, p. 379; Kleine, 2013, pp. 3-7) , or alternatively, where the informal inclusion of interested stakeholders may lead to the infusion of a process with increased legitimacy or effectiveness (Borrás and Jacobsson, 2004) . The tackling of counterfeiting online through legal means has not been particularly successful, as discussed in the previous section, in part as a result of the inability to implement legislation due to Under this Memorandum, signed by parties including eBay, Lacoste, Adidas and Nike, rather than relying upon court actions and the E-Commerce Directive in order to remove infringing content, intermediaries are expected to proactively identify and remove (for example) auction items, where those goods are deemed to be counterfeit (2011c, p. 5), act to temporarily or permanently suspend the accounts of repeat infringers (2011c, p. 6) and cooperate with customs and enforcement-related bodies in the investigation of alleged sales of counterfeit goods (2011c, p. 7). In particular, these methods are intended as a 'supply side' measure, impeding the transfer of goods that arrive in the EU by way of small consignments by preventing the sale of the counterfeit goods, rather than a 'demand side' measure typified by seizing purchased goods at the point of customs. In exchange, the Memorandum provides for a moratorium on litigation relating to alleged infringements being brought against online intermediaries 
Conclusions
The sale of counterfeit items in the EU has been further facilitated by the ability of alleged infringers to sell their wares directly to end users on the Internet through platforms such as web auction sites, making the identification and seizure of such goods more difficult. Indeed, as this paper has discussed, the ability of national authorities to individually counter such actions is significantly limited, and hard legal responses to the phenomenon have been equally ineffective. The agencification of cyber-security through the empowerment of the European Observatory, however, has allowed for the EU to establish itself as an actor in this field, by instituting it as a centre for information concerning the quantity and impact of online counterfeit sales, as well as sharing best practices and technical expertise in combatting such infringements with private and public sector actors throughout the EU. Furthermore, by establishing soft mechanisms of governance such as the Memorandum of Understanding, the EU has successfully managed to bring somewhat reluctant Internet platforms into a proactive enforcement regime, facilitating coordination, cooperation and information exchange in such a way as to counteract the limitations of the E-Commerce Directive.
